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Social historians of the Third Reich have been sleeping on the job for
too long.

Although the first signs of fitful arousal can now be discerned,1

we know little more of importance about group and class in Nazi Germany today
than wh~n Tim Mason publish~d hfs seminal article, ~Labor in the Third.Reich"
and David

Schoenbaum

Revolution .2
historical

Mason

his

ori gi na l

argued

that

and

provocative .· book,

contrary

to

propaganda

Hitler I s Social
cl aims,

whi'ch

scholarship had passively accepted up to then, Hitler did not·

destroy the class basis of German society; on the contrary, workers remained a·
distinct group, continued to be faithfu.l to old political loyalties, and set
limits

to Hitler's

power.

This

insight might,

by inspiring comparative

studies, have· resulted in a new understanding of the pluralistic character of
the Third Reich.

Mason and his disciples set off inste~d to document worker

sabotage of the production process, or at 1east ffod some i ndi cation that
proletarian opposition had impaired the execution of Hitlerian policy.
after many years
uncovered.3
and

of

conscientious

digging

no

such

proof

has

Even

ever. been

The evidence points to a different conclusion, that working men

women, while by no means particularly enthusiastic about the regime, did

not actively oppose it.

They merely did what was expected of them:

hard for little compensation ..

worked

Why, one would like to know~ did workers go

along with system?
Repression doubtless provides part of the answer, but there were clearly
limits to the extent that this could be effective.
but

Jobs are also important,

full employment does not always bring stability.

lead to a more complete explanation.

Schoenbaum's book may

He suggests that beneath the official

veneer of public life in the Third Reich a modernization process took place.
which, while shaped by the peculiar institutions to national socialism, had
long been underway and would continue well after the th.i rteen year orgy was

2

over.

While Schoenbaum focuses -mainly on elites, he assigns considerable

importance to social mobility as a stabilizing force within the politic:al
system.
Reich

It is difficult to test this thesis:
has

studied.4

never

been

measured~

social mobility in the Third

its mechanisms

analyzed,

or its

impacts

Yet beginnings must be made if historians are to learn how to

di sti ngui sh cl early the Lei stungsgesell schaft ( 11 achievement-oriented soci ety 11 )
that is Bonn from the Klassengesellschaft (class society) that was Weimar.
Vocational
certain

training provides a possible point of departure.

similarities can

education is unique.

be found elsewhere,

Although

the German system of labor

Its central feature is instruction in the workplace.

Masters teach Apprentices who, after three years of work-study·, are articled!
The Chambers .. of-Commerce administer the program through parti ci pati ng firms.
This system is a substitute for,
education.

rather than

a supplement to,

secondary

In the l at:e 1920 1 s reactionary empl ayers introduced industrial

apprenticeshi~s, which ha~e an obvious precedent in the traditions of German
artisanship (Handwerk), as a weapon in the struggle against socialism._ The
tactic

worked.

Today

no

less

than

one-half

of

West-German

grammar

school-1 eavers· (Vol ksschul abganger) embark on three-year courses of work..:.study
leading to articles. - The dec:isive phase in the de·velopment of the- vocational
training system falls between 1933 and 1945.

It was then that it was put into

practice, then too that it began to modify German society.
The Fuhrer came to power-without plaris for handling the working class
and, after the failure of ten ta ti ve efforts to generate social policy from
within Party ranks fell back on - the solutions offered by employers.· Albert
Vogler, the arch-conservative director of Verinigte Stahlwerke; was the most
i nfl uenti al corporate sponsor of the l abor-trai ni ng_ ·idea.

But it was a man

named Carl ( after 1933 a more germani c Karl) Arnhold who actually discovered

3

how

vocational

training

consciousness."

He . was

could
the

be

used

father

as

of

a weapon

to

modern · German

destroy
labor

11

cl ass

education ·

In 1925 he founded The German Institute for Technical

(Arbeitspadagogik}.

Labor Training, or DINTA (Deutsches Institut fUr technische Arbeitsschulung}
which, by means of newly-recruited Labor Engineers outfitted in white coats
and stop-watches, put his ideas into pract,ce in Ruhr industry during the late
1920 1 s.

In 1933 DINTA entered the G~rman Labor Front (OAF}+ as the Office for

Factory Leadership and Vocational Education (ABB}++.
important

labor

relations

ineffective outfit.

component

of

this

It soon became the most

otherwise

ramshackle

and

But while Hitler quickly grasped the importance of

apprenticeships as a propaganda measure, it was only in-late 1936 after the
armaments boom had begun to create severe shortages of skilled labor that his
deputies vested business with the powers ·necessary to establish a national
system

of

multiplied.

vocational

education.

The

number

of

apprenticeships

soon

Within eighteen months all but the small est firms had set. up

training programs, including instruction for jobs in offices and farms as well
as factories.
school

Between 1937 and the end of the war nearly all male grammar

leavers,

apprenticeships.

as

well

as

increasing

numbers

of

females,

entered

Although created to serve as handmaiden to the war economy,

vocational education soon outgre~ this role.• It trained excessive numbers of
· ski 11 ed workers, many of them in non-strategic fields'., turned out too few of
the semi-skilled operators needed for the numerous mass production jobs
opening up in the armaments industries, and aggravated shortages of unskilled
laborers such that the regime felt qbliged to adopt d_rastic
I

+ Deutsche Arbeitsfront
l

++Amt fur Betriegsfuhrung und Berufserziehung

expedients.

The

4

vocati anal training program had become a sacred cow - too popular to attack
head on.

Otherwise, it would have been abolished or cut back to accord with

the needs of a nation waging total war.
The demand for increased vocational training originated on the political
1 eft.

It was a major c·oncern at the 1919 annual meeting of the Free Trade

Unions at Nurnberg, where numerous delegates rode to protest against employers
hiring artisans (Handwerker) to do skilled jobs in industry, a practice which
whi 1e cost-effective deprived unsk i 11 ed 1aborers of a chance for promo ti on.
The

congress

called

for

a comprehensive

nati anal

program

of

factory

apprenticeships, which it proposed to administer jointly with industry.5
But it was the political right which acted first.
••
persuaded Vogler
to fund DINTA.

In 1925 Arnhold

It soon featured a heavy industry campaign

aimed at destroying the existing pattern of labor relations and replacing it
with an authoritarian scheme whose centerpiece was the idea of
communi ty 11

(Werksgemei nschaft).

empl ayer offensive

11
•••

According

to Gerald

Feldman,

11

factory

the

1927

whi 1 e waged ostensibly over wage and hours-of-work

questions [had] the broader object of breaking the system of compulsory
arbitration

connected. 11 6

and

the

political

and

social

policies

with

which

it

was

The campaign resulted in the worst labor conflict in the

hi story of the Weimar Republic, the Fall 1928 Great Lockout of 250,000 Ruhr
workers.

DINTA provided the

11

carrots II that accompanied the stick.

Between

1925 and 1930 Arnhold and his Labor Engineers set up training programs at
several Ruhr concerns.

Thanks to this effort, the number of apprenticeships

available doubled from 15,094 to over twice this amount.7

The unions, while

aware of the political effectiveness of the new program were powerless to do
anything about it.
The

new

Belatedly, they discovered that they had been outflanked.

apprenticeship

programs

offered

a strange

combination

of

5

practical

training ·and

political

indoctrination.

All

curricula were anchored in the following principles.
instruction ( 11 Eisen erzieht! --discipline.

11

Arnhold-inspired

The first phase of

Iron is the teacher! 11 )

was to inculcate

By working blocks of cold, hard, unforgiv·ing steel apprentices

(including those in non-manufacturing courses of study) were supposed to learn
the

virtues

of

exactness,

patience,

(Grundschulung) was also essential:

and

obedience.

Basic

educ a ti on

the apprentice was to be exposed to all

aspects of his subject so that he c.ould someday rise to Instruction-Master
(Lehrmeister).
as

possible

Moreover factory instruction was to be i'ntegrated as closely
into - the

production

management's point of view.
the

11

process

to

encourage

appreciation

of

Arnhold insisted above all the training encompass

whole man, 11 that is influence his entire way of life.

In a seemingly

endless stream of books, tracts, articles, speeches, and private conversations
he argued that once the workshop (Lehrwerkstatt) had_ replaced the school, the
factory would replace ·the union

as

the nucleus of social

organization, and the employer the political
addresses

and

leader as moral

political

guide.

His

usually terminated with rhapsodic exclamation that his methods

would elevate labor to

the

supreme human value:

for

despised but come to be appreciated

it would no longer be

what the German worker knew it at

bottom to be --- the source of human creativity and identity,

a

pleasure, arid

a national responsibility.8
Although Arnhold' s career always remained closely linked to industry he
devise·d much of Nazi labor ideology and many of the peculiar institutions set
up

to

promote

it.

DAF's

11

gospel

of

productive

achievement 11

(Leistungsideologie) held forth work as the measure of all things:
acceptability,

social

worth,

and

individual

merit.

In

political

1931 Arnhold met

Hitler, or rather was introduced to him _by Robert Ley, who after 1933 would

6

head the Labor .Front (OAF).

Ley had become a convert to DINTA methods while

working as a pl~nt manager for IG Farben.
with the Party.

His first contribution to Nazi labor policy in fact antedates

Hitler• s seizure of power.
(Reichsarbeitsdienst).
_11 July 1932,
unemployment

From then on Ar~hol~ worked closely

This was the idea of creating a Labor Service

This RAD, as he explained to Ruhr industry leaders on

should not be a mere

but

serve

as

a

"make-work organization"

school

for

citizenship.

It

to absorb

should

teach

discipline, increase familiarity w1th work situations, promote a sense of
responsibility to the community, instill
healthy·

spirit

of

nationalism

and,

both pride in workmanship and a
finally,

prepare

youths

for

apprenticeshi~s.9
After DINTA joined the Labor Front in 1933 Arnhold s~t up several other
"characteristic" Nazi labor institutions.
_L_abo_r

(Lei stungsertuchti gungswerk),

tra·i ni ng

for

His Program to Encourag~ Productive
instance,

sponsored

night· school

courses in towns and vi 11 ages throughout Germany .. The annual skills

competitions (Reichsberufswettkampfe), which ·he organized in 1937, involved
hundreds of thousands of entrants.

Contests began at the local

level,

~roce~ding to district and regi6n until the final selection of some 400 Reich
Victors (Reichssieger).

Arnhold also introduced the Model Factory Program

(Musterbetriebe), which put empl-oyers under heavy pressure to recognize DAF.-s
competence to impose heal th and safety standards.

Successful firms were

" ..• entitled to raise the gal den flag of the Labor Front proudly in front of
their factories."10
Although DAF 1 s diverse activities were not always _popular with industry,
they did not threaten employer domination of labor relations.
1935

Law

for

the

Regulation

of

National

Work

The 20 January

(Gesetz zur Ordnung der

nationalen Arbeit) is often r~ferred to as the Nazi labor charter.

It of

7

course presupposed the

unions, parties, even churches.

matters

relating

influences 11 ---from

factory-forei gn

Accardi ng to one commentator,

man who reads it should be happy.
all

11

absence· of all

11

Every rational

The law gives [the employer] a free hand in

to the, factory.

( Gefol gschaft) · to be expressly loyal

Even more [it]

requires

employees

and not to disturb the peace of the

factory lest they want to appear· before a social honor court.

It is their

·obligation to preserve the honor of the boss ( Betri ebsfuhrer). 11 11

Empl ayers

also controlled the machinery for labor control outside of the factory.
May

1934

the· new

established.

office

Trustees

of

Labor

set wages,

Trustee

heard

(Treuhander der Arbeit)

grievances,

made

appointments

factory councils (Vertrauensrate) and supervised working conditions.
single

exception

associations.

all

trustees

were

former

legal

experts

of

In
was
to

With a
empl oy·er

Business influence was also paramount at the Labor Ministry and

the regional Labor Offices (Arbeitsamter) subordinate to it.
The national labor training program instituted to implement preparations
for war was al so business-run.

On 10 December 1936 all

metalworking and

construction firms employing more than ten persons . were ordered ·to set up
apprenticeship

programs.

The

Chambers-of-Commerce

(Indus tri e-

und

Handel skammern), which traditionally had kept records on apprenticeships, were
assigned new responsibilities of accrediting training programs, administering
examinations, and· certifying the results.
Labor Ministry (Reichsanstalt fur

Two years later an agency of the

Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitsversicherung)

was set up to centr_al i ze this activity.

It set targets for each profession

and each region on the basis of national priorities, industrial requirements,
instructional facilities, and the number of school leavers.
law completed the process of <;:reating a
training

program;

it

made

industrial

11

total

11

The 1938 school

(luckenlos) national labor

training

compulsory

for

all

8

school-leavers.12
The placement process was geared to directing the fourteen year olds into
those jobs required by the war economy.

Orientation began with the "softening

up 11 of prospective apprentices by Hitler Youth propagandists who in the course
of home visits (Heimabenden) were to discourage them from entering "fad
professions"

(Modeberufen)

and

encourage

consideration

of

fields

shortages prevail or which are of special national interest."
this decision, factory visits could be arranged.
if

necessary,

give

batteries

of

To influence

The Labor Office would also,

psychological,

mental,

examinations in order to direct prospective apprentices
fields.

"where ·

The parents and the supervising firm

and

physical

into appropriate

signed the apprenticeship

contract (Lehrvertrag) on behalf of the candidate.

His name would then be

inscribed on a roll (Lehrlingsrolle) maintained by the Chambers-of-Commerce.
He next would be issued a work book, where progress would be meticulously
noted.

Violations of the work contract (Vertragsbruch) incurred liability

before the civil courts.13
But the existence of such controls did not mean that the apprenticeship
system worked as intended.

This was in part due to a miscalculation:

the

shortages of skilled metal workers, which had been acute in World War I,
disappeared in 1938 because of the success of

11

crash

11

training measures, an

increase in the number of those completing apprenticeships and a gradual shift
to serial production.

Wartime labor training policy (Nachwuchsplanung) had

four main goals and it fell short of meeting each of them.

The first, about

which industry and business were in complete agreement, was to reduce the
number of apprenticeships in the metalworking industries.
were classified as "fad professions. 14
11

After 1941 they

It was, according to one industry

spokesman, "unconscionable" to continue training more skilled workers than

9

could be productively engaged in the post-war future which, he predicted,
would

demand

manufacturing

either

mass

expertise

(Facharbeiter) .15

produced: goods

beyond

that

of

or

even

luxury
the

articles

German

requiring

ski 11 ed

worker

The labor training programs of 1942 and 1943 called for

reductions in the number of beginning three-year metal-working apprenticeships
from 130,000 to 105,000 per year.

But in 1943 some 149,000 entered the field,

and the number had fall en by only ten percent by 1945.

Until the final months

of the war the average number of metal-working apprentic·es was between 450,000
and 480,000.16
The

secbnd

non-essential

goal

fields.

was

to

reduce

the

number

of

apprenticeships

in

The Labor Training Plan of 1938-1939, which - was to

introduce a stage-by-stage phase out, cut back in three main areas:

the food

and fancy food industries (from 28,000 to 18,000), office-wort (from 70.000 to
60,000) and barbers, who were to be eliminated altogether.

Yet in 1945 some

19,000 persons -expected to enter training as butchers, bakers, and pastry
c·ooks, and another 59,000 persons to enroll in secre·tarial courses.

Barber

apprentices actually increased in number from 4000 in 1939 to 5200 in 1941.
3600 were to be admitted_ to the field in 1945 .17
The third goal,

eventually dropped ·as unrealizable, was- to step up

recruitment into the coal

mines.

Shortages of manpower existed a·t every

profession~l level in this war-essential field and were universally recognized
as threatening both the production effort and long-term national

interests.

Nonetheless;. the manpower shortfall increased every year after 1938.
the industry needed some 20,000 new entries and received 15,000.

In 1938,

Despite the

high priority assigned it, recruitment of school-leavers declined to 7000 by
1941, 5150 by 1942, and 2690 by 1943.

By then estimated requirements ha_d

increased to the ~ate of 30,000 per year.18

10

The . fourth

and most

important goal

school-leavers entering jobs,

was

increase

especially in metalworking,

(angelernte} and unskilled (ungelernte} labor.
programs to ·train Facharbei ter had· begun
workers at the lower ranks.

to

the

number

requiring

of

semi~

As early as 1937 the crash

to produce severe shortages of

A directive of March 1937 therefore ordered the

Labor Oftices to "exercise the same care in selecting jouths for these jobs as.·
exercised with regard to skilled apprenticeships.•i19

At the same time, the

DINTA-affiliate DATSCH+. was directed to revise and improve instructional
material

for semi-skilled trainees.·

But the .effort to enlist more male

school-leavers into semi-skilled apprenticeships never really got off the
ground.

In 1938-1939 they entered at only one-half the desired levels.

spite of strenuous propaganda efforts, the situation worsened thereafter.
You-th

Labor Training Plan

of 1942

noted

that it had

become

In
The

completely

imp·ossible for the textile industry. to recruit semi-skilled workers, indicated
an over a 11

reduction of those entering

18,000 in 1938 to 15,000,

semi-ski 11 ed · apprenticeships

and advised giving

from

up the effort in increase

apprenticeships of this type.20
-- Shortages of young male unskilled workers were even greater •. Fewer and
fewer were willing to do this kind of .work.

In 1934, some 200,000 male

school-leavers entered industry as unskilled laborers, in 1938, 1so;ooo, and
in 1939, 30,000.21

But this underestimates the full extent of the decrease.

In 1938, approximately forty-five per cent of those initially entering the
ranks of the unskilled did so only to gain a "breathing space" before choosing
skilled

apprenticeships.

By

1939

the

Labor Offices

had

concluded

reserves of teachable unskilled labor had been eliminated by the numerous
+ Deutscher AusschuB fur technfsches Schulwesen

that

11

- training

programs

set

up

during

the

armaments

boom.

Not

surprisingly,

employers warned that shortages of unski 11 ed labor threatened to be even more
serious than -those for semi-ski 11 ed workers. 22

Official accounts describe

the pool of unskilled labor as all but dried up, those left being little more
than useless misfits.
11

The Labor Training Plan of 1942 commented that an

Upgradi ng of unski 11 ed workers to semi-ski 11 ed- cannot be considered si nee

those youths doing such work lack the aptitude to advance. 11 23
testing confirmed this opinion.

Psychological

The Labor Training Pl an for 1943 no longer

even included the designation "unskilled labor" (Hilfsarbeiter), substituting
for it something called "vagrant labor" .(Hilfsarbeiter wechselnder Art).
this group

11
•••

To

[were] to be referred only the leftovers who cannot or will not

accept simple instructions.

In no case should a youngster be consigned to it

simply to meet a quota. 11 24
Manpower reserves were all

but eliminated early in

the war.

State

Secretary Landfried of the Labor Ministry estimated that 513,500 workers were
retrained in the twelve months after 1938, including 225,000 artisans, 180,000
industrial _workers, 36,000 aircraft workers, 46,000 persons from different
fields who learned welding, 21,000 persons instructed by the
Group Iron and Metal 11, as well

11

DAF Working

as a further 5500 -men trained in SA c_amps.

Industry retrained an additional 500,000 individuals as sem_i-skilled workers
on its own.

Another 223,133 persons received retraining in 1949.25

exhausted the re-serves of adult male German labor.

This

A reduction of one year in

the Reich's 1,142,903 apprenticeships for youths would have increased the
industrial

labor force

considered.26
foreigners.

There

by five

remained

percent.
only

two

However,

this option was never

possiblities:

German

women

and

12

Recruitment from abroad was the first choice.
however,

that this was

too

difficult.

It soon become obvious,

By· mid-1941

only 644,028

foreign

volunteers were at work in the Reich. The Sauckel labor drafts, which began in
Spring 1942 and ran until

the end of Spring 1944, increased total

employment to 2,367,000 by 30 June 1944.

foreign

In spite of low productivity·, the

employment of foreign slaves gradually reduced shortages of unskilled labor.27
But to handle the numerous semi-skilled jobs opening ·up in the armaments
industry the regime had no alternative to stepping up female employment.
This resource could have been tapped earli-er and much more effectively.
Contrary to official policy, which consigned them to hearth and home, German
women wanted

to work.28

The demand of girl

grammar

school

leavers

for

apprenticeships increased from 359,000 in 1934-1935, to 741,000 in 1938-1939~
and 1,256,000 in 1942-43.

Unlike the case for boys, apprenticeships for

girls, al though increasing, fell

progressively behind demand.

In 1934-1935

there were 84,300 places, in 1938-1939 221,111 and in 1942-1943 357,00o.29
Two

thirds

of

these,

however,

were

in

the

fields

of

secretarial

and

office-work.· Many women denied the opportunity of a three year apprenticeship
leading to skilled worker status eventually entered semi-skilled production
jobs.

Femal_e employment in industry increased by about 500,000· during the

war.

On

the

whole

this

occurred

without

offi"cial

pressure

and

was

concentrated in components assemble, where employment of women (as of 31 May
· of each year) increased from 207 ,411 · in 1939, to 279,307 in 1940, 347 ,416 in
1941, 416,560 in 1942, 554,147 in 1943, and 619,845 in 1944.30

To the

extent

that the Third Reich generated a new proletariat from domestic sources, it was
female~

Whether this shift• to the factories resulted in a significant role

change remains to be determined._
But males enjoyed a huge overall improvement in status.

In 1933 about

13

forty-five percent of industrial workers were ski 11 ed, another twenty percent
semi-skilled, and thirty-five percent unskilled.

After 1938 about ninety

percent of all boys leaving grammar school together with increasing numbers of
those who had left earlier entered three years apprenticeships in industry, ·
artisanship (Handwerk), commerce, or agriculture.
amounted to a phase-out of the proletariat.31

What had been set in motion
The Third Reich prepared the

ground for the skilled industrial economy of the Federal Republic.
Do the Nazis deserve historical credit for this fact?
obvious.

Two points seem

The first is that the present national system of labor training

derives from the Thi rd Rei ch. · ( A new genera ti on of Arbei tsp1dagogen is in
fact calling for its reexamination for this reason.)32. It is also true that
in the years of economic mobilization and war more skilled workers were
trained than could have been had either the ~arket had been allowed to work or
an efficient system of labor allocation been adopted.
unintended:
upon_ the

Yet this result was

employers, labor bureaucrats; and Nazi social theorists agreed
undesirability

of

11

overtraining 11

the

labor force.33 - A lengthy

article in the 1940-1941 yearbook of the Labor Science Institute of OAF
(Arbei tswi ssenschaftli ches I nsti tut) was. devoted to this problem.

Referring

to such-pseudoscientific psychopedagogical evidence as studies of brain weight
differentials, the results of IQ tests administered to US servicemen during
_World War I, ·and a hodge-podge of employer complaints, its author concluded
that the post-1933 changes in worki rig cl ass composition were not grounded in
biological law and therefore should be repealed.
he

recommended

replacing

In order to restore balance

three year apprenticeships with

one year basic

training courses.34
This might have been a risky course.

The vocational education program

was a successful response to rising expectations within the working class,

14

that is, for skills, status, and the prospect of advancement.

Without it, the

laboring men and women of Hitler I s Germany might have been far more restive
than they were.
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